Sense of Security - Security Advisory - SOS-11-010
Release Date. 19-Sep-2011
Last Update. -
Vendor Notification Date. 21-Feb-2011
Product. Cisco TelePresence Series
Platform. Cisco
Affected versions. C < = TC4.1.2, MXP <= F9.1
Severity Rating. Low - Medium
Impact. Cookie/credential theft,
impersonation,
loss of confidentiality,
client-side code execution,
denial of service.
Solution Status. Vendor patch
References. 1. CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488)
2. CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496)
3. CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500)
Details.
Cisco TelePresence is an umbrella term for Video Conferencing Hardware
and Software, Infrastructure and Endpoints. The C & MXP Series are the
Endpoints used on desks or in boardrooms to provide users with a
termination point for Video Conferencing.
1. Post-authentication HTML Injection - CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488):
Cisco TelePresence Endpoints have a web interface (HTTP or HTTPS) for
managing, configuring and reporting. It is possible to set the Call ID
(with H.323 or SIP) to a HTML value. If a call is made to another
endpoint and an authenticated user browses to the web interface on the
endpoint receiving the call (e.g. to view call statistics), the
HTML will render locally within the context of the logged in user. From
this point it is possible to make changes to the system as the
authenticated user. The flaw is due to the flexibility of the H.323 ID
or SIP Display Name fields and failure to correctly validate user input.
Examples (MXP):
Rebooting the system:
The attacker may also choose to change passwords in the system, disable
encryption or enable telnet:
2. Post-authentication Memory Corruption - CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496):
Cisco TelePresence systems (Endpoints and Infrastructure) use XPath for
setting and getting configuration.
Example syntax is:
http://ip/getxml?location=/Configuration/Video
The request is sent to a locally listening shell (tshell). This is the
case for all requests relating to performing an action on the system (e.g.
config get or set). The shell then sends the input to the "main"
application (/app/main, id=0), and the data is passed as a parameter.
It was discovered that the getXML handle does not properly perform
length checking on the user supplied input before passing it to the
tshell. Furthermore, there is no length checking performed in the tshell
and no bounds checking performed in the main application where the
parameter is consumed. As such, it is possible to send input that
exceeds the size of the receiving buffer, subsequently causing an
invalid address to be read. This causes a reboot on the Endpoints. The
VCS will not reboot, the process will crash by SIGSEGV (or sigabrt) but
it will restart the process itself which drops all calls.
Proof of Concept: GET
/wsgi/getxml?location="+("A"*5200)+("x60"*4)+("X"*4)+"HTTP/1.1rn
Host: 192.168.6.99rnrn"
Received signal SIGSEGV (11) in thread 0x129e8480, TID 2670
Illegal memory access at: 0x5858585c
Registers:
GPR00: 00f2c908 129e5960 129ef920 00000005 00000040 0000000c 00000037
0f315580
GPR08: 00000005 129e5a70 129e5a80 58585858 0f3272d4 11589858 129e6896
0000000b
GPR16: 129e6084 11164a1c 00000000 129e6894 00000037 1299ca18 00000005
00000002
GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac
129e5960
GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac
129e5960
NIP: 0f39abc8 MSR: 0000d032 OGPR3: 00000002
As you can see, the crash string is passed as a parameter in GPR 8.
The severity of this issue is compounded by the fact that the main
application runs as root, this could potentially lead to arbitrary code
execution.
3. Pre-authentication SIP Denial of Service - CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500):
Cisco TelePresence Endpoints utilise SIP for the call setup protocol.
Sending a SIP INVITE with a 4x8 a"s in the MAC Address field and the
receive field causes the system to reboot.
Proof of Concept: MXP:
Exception 0x1100 : Data TLB load miss Active task
FsmMain FSM process : SipTrnsp(0) FSM message : SipTrnsp_Send_Msg_Req
from SipTrnsp(0) Data TLB miss (DMISS) : 0x00000000 (illegal addr.
accessed)
Solution.
Upgrade to TC4.2 for the C series to fix validation issues.
Discovered by.
David Klein, Sense of Security Labs.
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The latest version of this advisory can be found at:
Click to access SOS-11-010.pdf
Other Sense of Security advisories can be found at:
http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/research/it-security-advisories.php
Fonte: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17871/